政府引导基金能否抑制控股股东股权质押？——基于耐心资本的视角

陈伟，张旭曦

（合肥工业大学经济学院，安徽合肥230601）

摘要：发展耐心资本是更好发挥政府投资基金作用、支持实体经济高质量发展的战略要求。本文利用2009—2024年A股上市公司数据，研究具有耐心资本属性的政府引导基金对控股股东股权质押行为的治理效应。研究发现，政府引导基金的进入能明显抑制控股股东的股权质押行为。机制分析表明，政府引导基金主要通过三条路径发挥抑制作用：一是资源赋能机制，削弱控股股东质押动机；二是内部公司治理机制，提升稳定型机构投资者持股比例；三是外部信息治理机制，通过吸引外部关注改善信息环境。异质性分析表明，政府引导基金的抑制作用在资金投向为“自身或第三方”、内控质量较低以及高科技行业的样本中更为明显。此外，在外部媒体监督压力较大及2013年“质押新规”实施后，抑制作用表现得更为突出。本文的研究为理解耐心资本的微观治理功能、防范化解股权质押风险提供了新的经验证据与政策启示。

基金项目：国家社会科学基金一般项目“储蓄变化对金融稳定的动态影响机制及风险防范研究”（23BJL030）；安徽省社会科学创新发展研究课题“政府引导基金驱动区域产业转型升级的机制、效应及优化政策研究”（2024CX517）

关键词：政府引导基金；耐心资本；股权质押；资源赋能；稳定型机构投资者；信息治理

作者简介：陈伟，合肥工业大学经济学院副教授；张旭曦，合肥工业大学经济学院硕士研究生。

引用格式：陈伟，张旭曦. 政府引导基金能否抑制控股股东股权质押？：基于耐心资本的视角［J］. 首都经济贸易大学学报，2026，28（5）：90-104.

Can Government-Guided Funds Restrain Share Pledges by Controlling Shareholders? A Patient Capital Perspective

CHEN Wei, ZHANG Xuxi

（Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230601）

Abstract: Developing "patient capital" has become a major strategic requirement for optimizing the functions of government investment funds and supporting the high-quality development of the real economy. Based on a dataset of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2024, this paper examines the deterrent effect of governmentguided funds (GGFs), a major representative form of patient capital, on controlling shareholders' share-pledging behavior. The empirical results show that GGF entry significantly reduces both the propensity and intensity of controlling shareholders' share pledging. This finding suggests that GGFs are not merely financial contributors that provide capital but also a stabilizing factor that reduces controlling shareholders' reliance on high-risk, short-term financing instruments. By integrating into corporate capital structures with a long-term investment horizon, GGFs provide strategic guidance, thereby curbing opportunistic behavior.

This study further explores three mechanisms through which GGFs deter controlling shareholders' share pledging. First, the resource empowerment mechanism operates by providing stable long-term equity capital and enhancing firms' overall creditworthiness, thereby weakening controlling shareholders' incentives to pledge shares. Second, GGF entry significantly increases the shareholding ratios of stable institutional investors, thereby enhancing the overall stability of external shareholding. Given their long-term investment orientation, these stable institutional investors have strong incentives to actively perform corporate governance functions. Third, the information governance mechanism operates by attracting heightened attention from external stakeholders (mainly analysts). This influx of professional scrutiny improves the corporate information environment and reduces information asymmetry, making it difficult for controlling shareholders to engage in opaque or high-risk pledging activities without being detected by the market.

Heterogeneity analysis reveals that governance effectiveness is shaped by firms' internal and external environments. The study finds that the deterrent effect of GGFs is more pronounced when pledged funds are directed to "self or third parties", when internal control quality is lower, and in high-tech industries. Additionally, it is more effective when external media scrutiny pressure is greater and after the promulgation of the 2013 "New Pledge Rules". This indicates that GGFs can, through their relatively professional information screening and motive identification capabilities, accurately identify the true intentions behind controlling shareholders' pledging. These findings provide new empirical evidence for understanding the micro-level governance function of patient capital in emerging markets. By offering a new perspective on how government-led funds prevent and defuse systemic financial risks, this study provides valuable policy implications for leveraging institutional investment to foster a more stable and efficient capital market environment.

Keywords: government-guided funds; patient capital; share pledging; resource empowerment; stable institutional investors; information governance

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